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“SAFE HARBOR” FOR THE INNOCENT INFRINGER IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 
TONYA M. EVANS* 
 
Concerned with potential liability for any infringing uses by their 
users, the Online Service Provider (OSP) industry successfully 
lobbied Congress to exempt OSPs from copyright liability under 
certain conditions through the “safe harbor” provisions found in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  Qualified OSPs receive 
safe harbor from copyright infringement liability if they fulfill certain 
criteria.  Absent safe harbor, OSPs could be held secondarily liable 
for infringing activities of their users even absent actual knowledge of 
any infringement.  Accordingly, if (or more accurately when) those 
users copy, perform, display, republish, or adapt works in ways 
violative of copyright, OSPs are shielded from liability altogether. 
This is in stark contrast to the strict liability nature of copyright 
infringement that applies generally in all cases.  In fact, courts only 
consider mental state, if at all, when the court calculates damages.  
The ordinary range of statutory damages is $750–$30,000 per 
infringement.  However, a court can increase the amount for willful 
infringement to $150,000 or decrease it to $200 in the case of 
innocent infringement; that is, in cases where the user neither knew 
nor had reason to know her use was infringing. 
Due to the strict liability nature of copyright and importance of 
mental state in the court’s discretionary determination of the amount 
of damages due, it is critical for copyright users and OSPs alike to be 
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able to reasonably anticipate the legal implications of their online 
activities.  Unfortunately, it is not only more difficult than ever for 
copyright users in particular to determine beforehand what activities 
are potentially or actually infringing or fair, it is also easier for them 
to infringe unintentionally in the online environment.  Congress 
included formalities of notice, registration, and publication in pre-
1976 versions of the Act to give end-users advance warning that their 
use may be infringing.  However, because those formalities are no 
longer required for rights to exist, it is especially difficult for users to 
determine whether their acts are infringing. 
Therefore, the average user, who carries the greatest economic 
risk of running afoul of the law given the range of damages and trend 
of large damage awards, also has a duty to determine the ultimate 
legal question of liability with no real assurance that their legal 
determination is correct.  In sum, today’s unwitting direct infringer—
also known as the innocent infringer—is not so fortunate. 
Academic commentators and user-advocate groups have decried 
the varied and various shortcomings of copyright liability as applied 
to innocent infringers in the digital age.  Even judges have implored 
Congress to clarify and reform the law, especially in the case of the 
excessive statutory damages dilemma.  Judges, academics, and 
laypersons have all raised serious concerns about the constitutionality 
of the current range of statutory damages far exceeding the notice, 
deterrence, and punishment goals of copyright, especially in the case 
of civil remedies. 
In adding my voice to this important reform debate, I assert a 
novel (even if aspirational) approach: Congress should amend the Act 
to afford safe harbor protections in the online context to certain 
classes of direct innocent infringers similar to those already afforded 
OSPs in the DMCA.  To this end, I offer a proposed statutory 
amendment to § 512 of the Act so that certain direct, but innocent, 
infringers avoid liability altogether. 
Accordingly, the primary goal of this Article is three-fold: (1) to 
explore the role of the innocent infringer archetype historically and in 
the digital age; (2) to highlight the tension between customary and 
generally accepted online uses and copyright law that compromise 
efficient use of technology and progress of the digital technologies, 
the Internet, and society at large; and (3) to offer a legislative fix in 
the form of safe harbor for direct innocent infringers.  Such an 
exemption seems not only more efficient but also more just in the 
online environment where unwitting infringement for the average 
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copyright consumer is far easier than ever to commit, extremely 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today’s consumers1 use a wide range of digital copyrighted 
works: from online music, television streaming, and gaming to news, 
videos, and electronic books.  They enjoy round-the-clock Internet 
connectivity and interactivity via multiple devices and in various 
mediums.  Online service providers (OSPs) deliver and maintain that 
1.  In this Article I use “consumer” and “user” interchangeably to describe a person who 
accesses, enjoys, and uses copyrighted works rather than a creator or rights holder who creates 
or exploits the bundle of rights granted in § 106 of the Copyright Act.  In many cases, the 
intended user or consumer is the party who buys or otherwise acquires the material and the 
creator/owner is the party who sells the material.  But as discussed hereinafter, users can also 
generate protectable content.  The resulting content is often referred to as user-generated 
content (UGC). See infra Part II.C. 
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connectivity and interactivity.  They also provide a range of services, 
including conduit services that allow users to connect with each other 
(e.g., Facebook or Pinterest) and remote storage services (e.g., 
Dropbox and Carbonite).2 
Concerned with potential liability for any infringing uses by their 
users, the OSP industry successfully lobbied Congress to exempt 
OSPs from copyright liability under certain conditions through the 
“safe harbor” provisions found in the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA).3  Qualified OSPs receive safe harbor from copyright 
infringement liability if they fulfill certain criteria before and after 
receiving notice of a user’s potentially infringing use.4  The criteria 
include removing or otherwise disabling the relevant material and 
notifying the user of the infringement claim.5  Absent safe harbor, 
courts could hold OSPs secondarily liable for infringing activities of 
their users even absent actual knowledge of any infringement.6 
Accordingly, if (or more accurately when) those users copy, 
perform, display, republish, or adapt works in ways violative of 
copyright, the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions shield OSPs from 
liability altogether.  This is in stark contrast to the strict liability 
nature of copyright infringement that applies generally in all cases.  In 
fact, courts only consider mental state, if at all, when courts calculate 
monetary damages.7  The ordinary range of statutory damages is 
$750–$30,000 per infringement.  However, a court can increase the 
amount for willful infringement to $150,000 or decrease it to $200 in 
the case of innocent infringement;8 that is, in cases where the user 
2.  Conduits allow users to communicate with each other (i.e., social media networks) 
and storage providers allow users to upload, exchange, and disseminate materials (i.e., 
YouTube or Vimeo). 
3.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998).  See infra Part III for a discussion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
and its safe harbors provisions. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  See infra Part III for a discussion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
and its safe harbors provisions. 
7.  A court assesses mental state in its discretionary determination of the amount of 
damages to award.  The general range of damages is $750–30,000 per infringement.  But a 
court may, in its discretion, reduce the amount to $200 per infringement for innocent 
infringement or increase the amount to $150,000 per infringement where a defendant is found 
to have infringed willfully. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
8.  An “innocent infringer” “is a defendant who infringes a copyright without intending 
to do so and without having a reason to suspect that she is doing so.” Jacqueline D. Lipton, 
Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and Innocent Copyright Infringement, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
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neither knew nor had reason to know her use was infringing.9 
It is critical for copyright users and OSPs alike to be able to 
reasonably anticipate the legal implications of their online activities 
for a number of reasons.  One important reason is that due to the strict 
liability nature of copyright, users cannot avoid liability simply 
because they did not intend to infringe.10  Another reason, as noted 
above, is the importance of mental state in the court’s discretionary 
determination of the amount of damages due.11  Unfortunately for 
users, it is not only more difficult than ever to determine beforehand 
what activities are potentially or actually infringing or fair, it is also 
easier to infringe unintentionally in the online environment, especially 
now that the formalities of notice, registration, and publication, which 
served as advance warning to end-users that their use may be 
infringing, are no longer required for rights to exist.12  Therefore, the 
average user, who carries the greatest economic risk of running afoul 
of the law given the range of damages13 and trend of large damage 
awards,14 also has a duty to determine the ultimate legal question of 
liability with no real assurance their legal determination is correct.  In 
sum, today’s unwitting direct infringer—also known as the innocent 
infringer—is not so fortunate. 
Academic commentators and user-advocate groups have decried 
the varied and various shortcomings of copyright liability as applied 
to innocent infringers in the digital age.15  Even judges have implored 
Congress to clarify and reform the law, especially in the wake of the 
excessive statutory damages dilemma.16  Judges, academics, and 
L. 767, 772–73 (2011). 
9.  See infra notes 40–44. 
10.  See Lipton, supra note 8, at 770–71 (noting that strict liability may be necessary in 
copyright “to circumvent the inherent difficulty of establishing a defendant’s culpable state of 
mind”). 
11.  See infra notes 40–44. 
12.  Copyright exists automatically when a literary or artistic work is fixed in some 
tangible medium of expression. 
13.  See infra notes 40–44. 
14.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
15.  See generally Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have 
to Give Notice about Their Use of Technical Protection Measures? (UC Berkeley Pub. Law 
Research, Working Paper No. 1058561, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1058561 
(identifying six types of consumer harms that have occurred from inadequate notice, including 
lack of expected interoperability, privacy invasions, security vulnerabilities, anti-competitive 
lock-out as to compatible systems, risks of inadvertent anti-circumvention liability, and 
unanticipated changing terms and discontinued service). 
16.  See Sony BMG Music v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010), aff ’d in 
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laypersons have all raised serious concerns about the constitutionality 
of the current range of statutory damages far exceeding the notice, 
deterrence, and punishment goals of copyright, especially in the case 
of civil remedies.  For example, Professors Pamela Samuelson and 
Tara Wheatland have described the trend of discretionary statutory 
damage awards as “frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, 
and sometimes grossly excessive.”17 
In adding my voice to this important reform debate, I assert a 
novel (even if aspirational) approach: Congress should amend the Act 
to afford safe harbor protections in the online context to certain 
classes of direct innocent infringers similar to those already afforded 
OSPs in the DMCA.  To this end, I offer a proposed statutory 
amendment to § 512 of the Act so that certain direct, but innocent, 
infringers avoid liability altogether.  This solution seems even more 
necessary now that a coalition of Internet Service Providers (ISPs)18 
have begun implementing the much anticipated industry response to 
part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011).  In Sony, Judge Nancy 
Gertner implored Congress to take action to stop excessive damage awards in music file 
sharing cases. Id. at 95–96.  See also Capitol Records v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. 
Minn. 2008).  In Capitol Records, Chief Judge Davis implored Congress to revisit statutory 
damages even in peer-to-peer cases when innocent infringement is not a viable defense:   
The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to implore 
Congress to amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer-to-
peer network cases such as the one currently before this Court. . . . While the Court 
does not discount Plaintiffs’ claim that, cumulatively, illegal downloading has far-
reaching effects on their businesses, the damages awarded in this case are wholly 
disproportionate to the damages suffered by Plaintiffs.  Thomas allegedly infringed 
on the copyrights of 24 songs—the equivalent of approximately three CDs, costing 
less than $54, and yet the total damages awarded is $222,000—more than five 
hundred times the cost of buying 24 separate CDs and more than four thousand 
times the cost of three CDs.  While the Copyright Act was intended to permit 
statutory damages that are larger than the simple cost of the infringed works in order 
to make infringing a far less attractive alternative than legitimately purchasing the 
songs, surely damages that are more than one hundred times the cost of the works 
would serve as a sufficient deterrent. 
Id. at 1227. 
17.  See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009).  In their 
comprehensive critique of statutory damages in copyright law, Professors Samuelson and 
Wheatland aptly note that “[i]n the modern world in which the average person in her day-to-
day life interacts with many copyrighted works in a way that may implicate copyright law, the 
dangers posed by the lack of meaningful constraints on statutory damage awards are acute.” Id. 
at 443. 
18.  All ISPs are OSPs, but not all OSPs are ISPs. See generally Online Service 
Provider, COMPUTER BUS. RESEARCH, http://www.computerbusinessres earch.com/Home /ebus
iness/online-service-provider (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
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Internet piracy known as the “six strikes” rule and Copyright Alert 
System (CAS).19  The goals of the CAS are to monitor the online 
activities of subscribers, to identify potentially infringing uses, and to 
warn users.  Warnings come with consequences that include slower 
bandwidth or even loss of service altogether.20 
Accordingly, the primary goal of this Article is three-fold: (1) to 
explore the role of the innocent infringer archetype historically and in 
the digital age; (2) to highlight the tension between customary and 
generally accepted online uses and copyright law that compromise the 
efficient use of technology and progress of the digital technologies, 
the Internet, and society at large; and (3) to offer a legislative fix in 
the form of safe harbor for direct innocent infringers.  Such an 
exemption seems not only more efficient but also more just in the 
online environment where unwitting infringement for the average 
copyright consumer is far easier than ever to commit, extremely 
difficult to police, and often causes little, if any, cognizable market 
harm.21 
To be clear, I am not arguing that all information wants to be 
free.22  I believe copyright liability has its place in both the brick and 
mortar and digital worlds.  And as between an innocent copyright 
owner and an innocent infringer, in general the latter should bear the 
loss and harm the infringement causes.  But I assert that without 
specific harm—or with resulting harm to the copyright owner that is 
arguably de minimis—little exists in the case of innocent 
infringement to compensate with monetary damages. 
Additionally, by its very nature, a stiffer penalty could never 
19.  See  Chloe Albanesius, ISPs Shed Light on Plans for ‘Six Strikes’ Copyright Alerts, 
PCMAG.COM (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2416092,00.asp; 
Copyright Alert System, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO., http://www.copyrightinformatio n.org/th
e- copyright-alert-system/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
20.  CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO, supra note 19; see also Peter K. Yu, The Graduated 
Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the graduated 
response, exploring the system’s effectiveness in addressing massive online copyright 
infringement, and highlighting the problems and unintended consequences brought about by 
the system). 
21.  See generally Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285 (2009) (explaining that 
“copytraps” result when websites invite innocent users to access copyrighted expression in 
ways that seem, to the good faith user, to be legal but are in fact actually infringing). 
22.  This phrase is attributed to Silicon Valley futurist Steward Brand and is believed to 
have been uttered for the first time at the first Hacker’s Conference in 1984 (which he helped 
to organize). See Richard Siklos, Information wants to be free . . . and expensive, 
CNNMONEY.COM (July 20, 2009), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2009/07/20/information-wants-
to-be-free-and-expensive/. 
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deter innocent infringement because innocents act without knowledge 
that their actions may be infringing.  Therefore, safe harbor for certain 
uses of copyrighted works online seems not only desirable but 
necessary in order to reflect established informal behavioral patterns 
consistent with, and supportive of, a robust and dynamic Internet 
system.  Such would go a long way in settling expectations of all 
parties and also reflect the type of progress contemplated in 
copyright’s constitutional call.23 
In Part II, I discuss the innocent infringer dilemma in greater 
detail.  I highlight the policy considerations reflecting the importance 
of a viable innocent infringer defense as part of “just” statutory 
damage awards in infringement actions and compare the 21st century 
user of copyrighted material to the traditional user model, with a 
particular focus on the user expectations and online norms of the 
digital native.24 
In Part III, I examine Title II of the DMCA, which created 
limitations on the liability of conduit and storage OSPs for copyright 
infringement if certain criteria are met.  Ultimately, this Part serves to 
highlight the shared concerns between OSPs and good faith users of 
their services who, I argue, should be able to avail themselves of 
similar protections. 
In Part IV, I propose an amendment to the DMCA to extend its 
safe harbor protections to users as well.  In this way, users who might 
otherwise argue innocent infringement after liability is determined 
can instead avoid liability altogether in the same way OSPs do 
currently.  The proposed amendment offers to Congress specific 
statutory language creating safe harbor protections to a certain class 
of good faith online users of digital goods similar to those currently 
enjoyed by OSPs. 
23.  The purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause found in Article I, section 8, clause 
8 of the United States Constitution is to promote progress of science (in the case of copyright) 
and useful arts (in the case of patents). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The means of achieving 
the stated purpose is through the economic incentive of exclusive rights for “limited times[.]” 
Id. 
24.  Marc Prensky is credited with coining the term digital native.  Marc Prensky, Digital 
Natives, Digital Immigrant, 9 ON THE HORIZON 1 (Oct. 2001), available at  h ttp://www.marcpr
ensky.com/writing/Prensky%20-%20Digital%20Natives,%20Digital%20Immigrants%20-%20
Part1.pdf; see Digital Natives, YOUTH AND MEDIA, http://youthandmedia.org/projects/digital-
n atives/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (defining digital natives as “those who grow up immersed 
in digital technologies, for whom a life fully integrated with digital devices, is the norm”); see 
also JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 4–7 (2008). 
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Finally, in Part V, I offer concrete examples of how a court 
would apply the user safe harbor to certain activities that average 
accidental and good faith infringers engage in.  User safe harbor 
seems optimal in the digital environment, especially when users 
access digital goods that neither bear visible copyright notice nor 
provide some other notice at the point of access.  Such provisions are 
also optimal when copyright management information (CMI)25 is 
encrypted and, therefore, inaccessible to users, and the user, upon 
receiving notice, takes immediate action to remedy the infringing 
activity. 
II.  THE INNOCENT INFRINGER: THEN AND NOW 
The Internet and digital technology have ushered in a brave new 
world of ways to create and to disseminate literary and artistic works 
that, when original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression, are 
protected by copyright.  Many of these means of digital creation and 
dissemination employ collaborative and cumulative methods of 
transforming what already exists into something new.  With little 
effort, anyone can transform from mere consumer, to republisher, to 
creator in her own right.  Indeed, most websites invite their visitors to 
access and exploit works hosted on their sites with the all-too-familiar 
social plug-in invitation: “share.”26 
The problem is that not all website owners control all of the 
copyrighted material accessible on their sites.  For example, a site 
owner may have the legal right to make use of a copy but not to create 
additional copies (electronically or otherwise).  Site owners also may 
not have the legal right to adapt, publicly display, or distribute copies 
to others (rights that the copyright owner holds).  Therefore, each 
time a user clicks “share,” reposts a status or image via Facebook or 
25.  Copyright management information (CMI) is defined as information relating to the 
title, author, owner (if different), dates of creation and publication, and conditions of use 
“conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of 
a work.” 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2013). 
 26.  The share feature found on most websites is explained as follows:    
Third-party websites and online publications help facilitate the publication and 
spread of user-generated content by including sidebar widgets on their web pages. 
These digital icons allow users to link directly to different social media accounts, 
where they can automatically post and share news stories, images, video and other 
content from the third-party website. 
Types of Consumer Generated Digital Content, BOUNDLESS.COM, https://www.b oundless.com
/marketing/social-media-marketing/introduction-to-social-media-digital-marketing/types-of-c o
nsumer-generated-digital-content/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
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via a website, or retweets a tweet via Twitter, the potential for 
copyright infringement exists.27 
Copyright consumers can now effortlessly create perfect digital 
copies of protected works without permission and distribute them to 
one, dozens, hundreds, or thousands of others with only a few clicks 
of a mouse or taps on the touch screen of a handheld device.  Some do 
so with actual knowledge that the works are protected by copyright 
and that their use is an infringement.  Others do so without such 
knowledge (actual or otherwise) or with a good faith but mistaken 
belief that their use was fair.  This is particularly true for the digital 
native, best understood as someone born after 1980 when social 
digital technologies emerged.  Also sometimes referred to as 
Generations Z28 and C,29 digital natives have experienced and have 
come to expect round-the-clock access to networked digital 
technologies and have mastered the skills to exploit those 
technologies at an early age.30  Digital immigrants too have come to 
expect and require 24/7 connectivity to work, play, and connect. 
Access to, and exploitation of, copyrighted works for the average 
consumer today is far different than they were for their 19th and 20th 
century counterparts.  For example, unlike their digital “immigrant” 
parents (including most judges and members of Congress) who 
separate virtual and real world identities, digital natives see 
themselves as having only one identity that they express via various 
modes and media.31  In light of their digital immersion, digital natives 
relate to people (friends, family, and strangers alike), information, 
27.  Participating in social networks requires adherence to the company’s terms of use.  
Opting into a social network, however, often means opting out of the full protections of 
copyright law. See generally Michael E. Kenneally, Commandeering Copyright, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2012) (examining “the increasingly common phenomenon of 
copyright commandeering, which is the use of standardized contracts and other legal devices 
to reassign, on a massive scale, the entitlements initially assigned by copyright law”). 
28.  See generally Grail Research, Consumers of Tomorrow: Insights and Observations 
About Generation Z (Nov. 2011), available at  http://www.grailre search.com/pdf/ContenP odsP
df/Consumers_of_Tomorrow_Insights_and_Observations_About_Generation_Z.pdf 
(describing the Generation Z demographic as those born in the 1990s through 2010 who are 
constantly connected to, comfortable with, and dependent on technology). 
29.  Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Generation C: Childhood, Code, and Creativity, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1979, 1980 n.3 (2012) (describing the possible meanings of the C in Generation 
C). 
30.  See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 24, at 1. 
31.  See id. at 4.  Additionally, digital natives are “joined by a set of common practices, 
including the amount of time they spend using digital technologies, and their pattern of use of 
the technologies to access and use information and create new knowledge and art forms.” Id. 
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creativity, education, business, government, and themselves in vastly 
different ways than those charged with the task of enforcing laws that 
those interactions implicate.32  However, those actions and 
interactions are often at odds with copyright law. 
Understanding these fundamental differences provides great 
insight into today’s accepted online behaviors.  This understanding, in 
turn, can lead to ways of adapting copyright law to encourage 
beneficial uses (read: fair) and continue to deter harmful ones.33  
Professor Rebecca Tushnet expounds on this point in her article titled 
User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice.  Professor 
Tushnet explains that “user-generated fair use principles offer their 
own definition of transformation, both implicit and explicit, that draw 
not only on formal copyright law but also on the practices of specific 
creative communities.”34  Michael J. Madison’s work in this area 
helps to illuminate the value of accepted online social and cultural 
patterns.35  Specifically, Professor Madison argues that courts already 
informally and even formally give legal deference to certain accepted 
social and cultural patterns when courts weigh whether a use is fair.36  
It makes sense, therefore, that such accepted practices can serve as 
examples of the types of practices and behaviors ideally suited for 
user safe harbor consideration. 
32.  See generally id. at 5–12. 
33.  Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497, 499 (2008). 
34.  Id.  Professor Tushnet goes on to say:  
Most people ripping, mixing[,] and burning have given little thought to the 
legitimate boundaries of creative appropriation.  When they do, however, they can 
articulate good reason that not every possible use of a copyrighted work should 
require the consent of, or payment to, the copyright owner, even when a license 
might theoretically be available.  These insights into transformativeness in practice 
should reciprocally influence formal copyright law. 
Id. 
35.  See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1525, 1623 (2004) (arguing that the affirmative defense of fair use should also 
consider whether a challenged use is part of a recognized and generally accepted social or 
cultural pattern).  Professor Madison notes that courts often implicitly consider accepted 
patterns in fair use determinations.  However, some courts cling to the four factors set forth in 
Section 107 of the Act.  Accordingly, he argues that “[d]ecisions regarding whether any given 
unauthorized ‘use’ of a copyrighted work is ‘fair’ under § 107 should be judged by whether 
that ‘use’ is undertaken in the context of a recognized social or cultural pattern, and the four 
statutory fair use factors should be interpreted and applied as part of an overall pattern-oriented 
framework.” Id. 
36.  See id. 
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A.  Copyright & Infringement 
To better understand infringement and, ultimately, the 
corresponding problems the average digital content consumer and 
consumer-as-creator face, one must first understand the rights at 
issue.  Copyright is a bundle of exclusive rights granted to a copyright 
owner that gives her the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, 
adapt, and publicly display or perform the work, and to authorize 
others to do so (or not).  Each right can be disaggregated from the rest 
and sold, licensed, or otherwise exploited as one, some, or all.37  The 
subject matter of the copyright monopoly consists of a range of 
original literary and artistic works fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.38  Copyright infringement, a strict liability offense, occurs 
when someone exercises any of the exclusive rights without 
permission.  Liability attaches when a copyright defendant fails to 
proffer a sufficient legal defense.39 
A copyright owner can seek either actual damages and 
defendant’s profits40 or statutory damages41 that range from a 
minimum of $750 to a maximum of $30,000 for each work 
infringed.42  The court, in turn, has the discretion to decrease damages 
to a minimum of $200 per infringement in the case of innocent 
infringement or to increase the award to a maximum of $150,000 for 
willfully committed infringement.43  In addition, courts remit 
damages altogether for innocent infringers who are affiliated with a 
nonprofit educational institution and for public broadcasting 
entities.44 
37.  The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2013).  Section 106 lists a copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights and explains that “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights 
to do and to authorize any of the [106 rights].”  Those rights include the right to reproduce, 
prepare derivative works, distribute copies and display or perform publicly. Id. 
38.  Id. § 102(a). 
39.  The most common defenses other than the innocent infringer defense includes: 
copyright invalidity that challenges whether a work is in fact original, whether it is the proper 
subject matter of copyright, or whether the plaintiff is in fact the owner; de minimis use; fair 
use; and independent creation. 
40.  Id. § 504(a)(1). 
41.  Id. § 504(a)(2).  Statutory damages and attorney’s fees are available only if the 
plaintiff timely registered the work with the Copyright Office prior to the infringement or 
within three months of publication. 
42.  Id. § 504(c)(1). 
43.  Id. § 504(c)(2).  Unfortunately, the term “willful” is not defined in the Act and no 
examples are offered to provide additional guidance. 
44.  Id. § 504(c)(2)(i)–(ii).  Although the law provides explicit discretionary limits on 
liability for certain good faith infringers, in practice “the lower level of statutory damages is 
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Both in concept and intent, the reduced damage awards for 
innocent infringement reflect the Act’s requirement that damages be 
just.  However, for a number of reasons unrelated to the defense itself, 
in the digital age innocent infringement seems a defense in name 
only.  In isolation this reality may not be cause for alarm.  But, in 
light of the parallel reality that statutory damage awards as a whole 
have become not only unjust but plainly penal, the existence of an 
anemic innocent infringer defense incapable of counterbalancing the 
excessive awards at the upper range of damages is particularly 
troublesome.45 
B.  The Innocent Infringer Archetype  
Historically, copyright law shielded a copyright user who 
infringed unintentionally from the more onerous damage awards that 
flowed from its strict liability scheme.  This unintentionally infringing 
copyright consumer, referred to in the Act as an innocent infringer, is 
one who neither knew nor should have known that her use was 
infringing.46  Professor Jacqueline D. Lipton offers three categories 
for the innocent infringer archetype:   
hardly ever used.” See generally Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: 
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1221 (2010) [hereinafter Directions for 
Reform].  This article was a joint effort by the members of The Copyright Principles Project 
(CPP).  Professor Samuelson goes on to say:  
[T]he wide numerical range of permitted awards, coupled with the lack of standards 
or guidelines for awards, the ability of the plaintiff to unilaterally elect an award of 
statutory damages at any time in the litigation, and the willingness of courts and 
juries to decide that infringement was willful if the defendant should have realized 
his acts were infringing, has too often led to awards that seem arbitrary and 
capricious, inconsistent with awards in similar cases, and sometimes grossly 
excessive or disproportionate when compared with a realistic assessment of actual 
damages and profits. 
Id. 
45.  Some of the most notorious statutory damages award include a $1.92 million 
judgment against Jammie Thomas-Rasset, held liable for downloading and sharing twenty-four 
songs on KaZaA’s file-sharing network, a $675,000 award against college student Joel 
Tenenbaum for downloading and sharing thirty songs in the same manner, and sixteen-year old 
Whitney Harper, who—despite asserting an innocent infringer defense—was ordered to pay 
$750 per song for downloading 27 songs. See Dave Itzkoff, $1.92 Million Fine for Music 
Piracy, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/arts/music/20arts-1 9
2M ILLIONFI_BRF.html; Dave Itzkoff, Student Fined $670,000 in Downloading Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 31, 2009), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/judge-rules-student-is-lia
ble-in-music-download-case/; David Kravets, Former Teen Cheerleader Dinged $27,750 for 
File Sharing 37 Songs, WIRED (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/201 0/02/for
mer-teen-cheerleader-dinged-27750-for-infringing-37-songs/. 
46.  Lipton, supra note 8, at 772–73. 
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First, there are cases of “unconscious” or “subconscious” copying 
in which the defendant’s expression is copied from the plaintiff’s 
original work, but the defendant has, in good faith, forgotten the 
source of the work.  Second, innocent infringement occurs when 
the defendant has, in good faith, copied material received from a 
third party, believing it to be original material or that the third 
party is otherwise authorized to give permission to copy.  Finally, 
the third category includes deliberate copying by a defendant who 
mistakenly believes either that the copied material is in the public 
domain or that there is another legitimate reason why the copying 
is not an infringement.47   
 
The court considers the innocent infringer “defense” in its discretion 
at the remedies phase of an infringement suit.  It allows a judge to 
permit a defendant found liable to pay a reduced amount in statutory 
damages if that defendant proves she did not know her use was 
infringing or if she had a reasonable good faith belief that the use was 
a permissible or fair use.48  The innocent infringer doctrine pre-dates 
statutory damages and has persisted through every major amendment 
of the Act to date.49 
However, innocent infringement is far more difficult to establish 
in the digital context.  As discussed earlier, the resulting damages in 
some cases bear no reasonable relationship to the harm and have a 
penal rather than compensatory effect.50  The reasons lie in two areas.  
The first is the overly-broad interpretation of “notice” when digital 
works are involved.  The second is judicial discretion that seems 
skewed toward the upper range of statutory damages permitted.51  
Instead of leaving the innocent infringement determination until the 
remedies phase, a more efficient and just approach would provide 
users safe harbor under certain circumstances before liability is 
actually assessed. 
47.  Id. at 773.  
48.  Although innocent infringement does not immunize a defendant from liability for 
copyright infringement, “the innocence of the defendant may affect the remedies available to 
the plaintiff.” See Lipton, supra note 8, at 774. 
49.  See generally Brian Sheridan, The Age of Forgotten Innocence: The Dangers of 
Applying Analog Restrictions to Innocent Infringement in the Digital Era, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1453 (2011). 
50.  See generally Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 441. 
51.  See id. at 483. 
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 1.  Notice 
The Act bars defendants found to have notice of a copyright 
claim from asserting the innocent infringer defense to mitigate 
damages.52  Notice in the digital and online contexts, however, is an 
elusive concept.  This is especially true when the very nature of a 
copyrighted digital work precludes notice on the copy in the 
traditional sense or when CMI is embedded and encrypted and 
therefore inaccessible to the consumer.  As a result, today’s unwitting 
users of digital goods are neither as informed at the point-of-access of 
an owner’s claim of copyright nor as protected by formalities as their 
19th and 20th century counterparts. 
For example, the average digital copyright consumer is often 
also a republisher when she utilizes the ubiquitous “share” features 
available on virtually every website and application (app),53 
especially those featuring “communicative” works.54  A user can also 
become a second-generation creator if she, for example, adapts the 
original work to create a new musical work, video, or meme,55 or she 
is an appropriation artist and uses existing materials (including some 
protected by copyright) to create new works.56  However, both the 
“accidental infringers” and “mea culpa infringers” may not have 
sufficient notice when using protected works.  Nonetheless, in both 
cases courts would otherwise hold these users strictly liable for 
infringement absent some safe harbor protection from liability.  
Therefore, my user safe harbor proposal treats notice as a factor in 
determining liability rather than its present function in the copyright 
framework as a factor in determining the amount of a damage award. 
52.  17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (2013). 
53.  The movie industry is scrutinizing closely the smart phone application market for a 
new frontier of copyright infringement worries. See Dara Kerr, Movie studios target mobile 
apps for copyright infringement, CNET.COM (Feb. 28, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10 23
_3-57571976-93/movie-studios-target-mobile-apps-for-copyright-infringement/. 
54.  See Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (describing a 
communicative work as “one that is valued not primarily for its physical qualities, such as a 
hammer, but for the intellectual content that it conveys, such as a book or, as [in that case], a 
video.”). 
55.  A meme is an image or video that Internet users pass electronically from one to 
another.  It is often humorous or provocative, thus increasing its “viral” potential and appeal 
online.  For additional information on memes, see Paul Gil, What Is a ‘Meme’? What Are 
Examples of Modern Internet Memes?, ABOUT.COM, http://netforbeginn ers.about.com/od/w
eirdwebculture/f/What-Is-an-Internet-Meme.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
56.  See generally Tonya M. Evans, Reverse Engineering IP, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 61, 68–71 (2013) (discussing the tension between appropriation art and copyright). 
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 2.  Statutory Damages 
A lack of clear legislative guidance to the courts in the 
discretionary judicial determination of a just remedy has led to a 
serious lack of continuity of court decisions and arbitrary and 
excessive awards.57  This is especially troubling to the innocent 
infringer now that all of the mandatory formalities (as noted above) 
have been removed that historically gave users a reasonable 
opportunity to know or discover whether and under what 
circumstances a work is protected.58  Therefore, safe harbor for the 
direct unwitting and, in some cases accidental, infringer seems both 
appropriate and necessary. 
Congress created the first federal statutory damages framework 
in the 1909 Act.59  Prior to 1909, copyright claimants successful in an 
infringement action could receive a “per sheet” (a.k.a. per copy) 
penalty of .50 cents (later increased to $1) for infringing copies found 
in defendant’s possession.60  The legislative history prior to the 1909 
Act revision shows Congress was very dissatisfied with a per sheet 
penalty due in part to the decidedly “penal character” in an otherwise 
civil setting.61  The penal effect often led judges to construe statutory 
damages narrowly in order to lessen the severity of the statutorily 
prescribed remedy.  Accordingly, any part of the Act having a penal 
effect should be scrutinized closely. 
The 1909 Act revision introduced three important reforms.  First, 
it provided for actual damages and defendant’s profits, as well as 
forfeiture of infringing copies and a permanent injunction.62  Second, 
it eliminated the per sheet penalty in favor of a “per infringement” 
rule.63  Third, it created a new generalized regime of statutory 
damages available to plaintiffs “in lieu of” actual damages and profits 
for situations in which it was difficult to ascertain actual damages or 
57.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 443. 
58.  If Congress intends to maintain the statutory damage scheme, it must provide 
reasonable guidelines to courts on how to award damages in a consistent and just manner. See 
Samuelson et al., supra note 44, at 1220. 
59.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 447 n.22 (noting that the 1909 Act was 
not the first United States copyright statute to provide for statutory damages, but was the first 
federal law to apply to all copyrighted works). 
60.  Id. at 447. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. at 448. 
63.  Id. 
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profits.64  The statute also set a range of damage awards65 and 
directed judges to make an actual statutory award determination in an 
amount deemed just.66  Additionally, and importantly, Congress 
provided express guidance to the courts on the appropriate amount of 
compensation to award given the prescribed range.  Section 101(b)67 
suggested specific amounts for certain common types of 
infringement.68 
Courts charged with the task of applying that new statutory 
damages framework identified its purpose as granting fair 
compensation to copyright owners when it is difficult or impossible to 
determine the actual damages to the owner and the defendant’s 
profits.69  Some courts of that day even refused to grant statutory 
damages when actual damages and profits could be reasonably 
ascertained.70  In fact, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the 
1909 Act’s statutory damage provision was unavailable in cases 
where actual damages and profits were established.71  Currently, to 
the extent that infringement controversies even make it to and through 
the judicial process, a startling trend of high and excessive awards is 
afoot.  Many commentators and even some judges have seriously 
questioned whether recent statutory damage awards even come close 
to reflecting fair and just compensation, even for the standard 
infringer, and challenge the statute’s constitutionality.72 
By creating a tripartite statutory damage framework within the 
same section of the Act, Congress intended to encourage modest 
awards against innocent infringers, moderate awards against most 
64.  Id. 
65.  The range was between $250 and $5,000 per infringement; although, the court also 
had the discretion to go beyond the $5,000 cap where the infringement was continuing and, 
presumably, particularly, willful and egregious. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 
448. 
66.  Id. 
67.  17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (superseded). 
68.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 449.  The suggestions included: “$10 for 
every infringing copy of a painting, statue, or sculpture; $1 per infringing copy of other works; 
$50 for every infringing performance of a lecture, sermon, or address; $10 for every infringing 
performance of a musical composition. . . .” Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. at 450 (citing Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley, 252 F. 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1918)). 
72.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 480–97 (arguing that some statutory 
damage awards are inconsistent with both congressional intent and Due Process principles of 
the Constitution). 
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ordinary infringers, and hefty awards against egregious infringers.73  
The primary goal of the former (modest and moderate awards) is to 
compensate the plaintiff, the latter (willful) to punish past acts and 
deter future acts.74  However, the reality of damage awards in cases of 
even ordinary infringement neither reflects the intention nor the goal 
of compensation and deterrence.  Congress may reach a better, more 
just result in cases of accidental or mea culpa infringement by 
channeling certain commonplace noncommercial online user 
behaviors away from strict liability and offering, instead, safe harbor 
from liability to those users; provided the users, once notified, work 
expeditiously and in good faith to minimize further harm.  I explain 
this point further in Part V. 
C.  Potential Beneficiaries of a Safe Harbor Exemption 
The end-user is no longer a passive recipient of copyrighted 
works.75  Today’s user is often involved in making some cumulative 
contribution to an existing work or transforming it into new user 
generated content (UGC).76  This is true for consumers who knew or 
should have known that their use was infringing, as well as those who 
either did not know their use was infringing or who reasonably (but 
73.  Id. at 460–63 (noting rampant inconsistencies in the case law with some clearly 
willful infringers ordered to pay nominal damages and some innocent infringers with strong, or 
at least plausible, but unsuccessful fair use claims being ordered to pay a king’s ransom).  
74.  Id. at 500. 
75.  See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1459, 1460 (2008). 
76.  UGC, which entered mainstream lexicon in 2005 via web publishing and new media 
content circles, “covers a range of media content available in a range of modern 
communications technologies . . . . It is used for a wide range of applications, including 
problem processing, news, gossip and research and reflects the expansion of media production 
through new technologies that are accessible and affordable to the general public.” User-
Generated Content, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User-generated_content (last 
modified Sept. 9, 2013).  UGC has experienced tremendous growth in recent years and shows 
no signs of slowing despite often being at odds with traditional notions of copyright.  Professor 
Edward Lee explains this phenomenon as follows:  
The informal practices associated with user-generated content make manifest three 
significant features of our copyright system that have escaped the attention of legal 
scholars: (i) our copyright system could not function without informal copyright 
practices; (ii) collectively, users wield far more power in influencing the shape of 
copyright law than is commonly perceived; and (iii) uncertainty in formal copyright 
law can lead to the phenomenon of “warming,” in which—unlike chilling—users 
are emboldened to make unauthorized uses of copyrighted works based on seeing 
what appears to be an increasingly accepted practice. 
Lee, supra note 75, at 1459. 
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mistakenly) believed their use was lawful.77  In fact, at least two 
generations of users are digital natives who may never have 
purchased physical copies of music like a compact disc or LP as did 
their digital immigrant parents.78  However, in cases involving digital 
goods, judges deem users to have notice (constructive or at least 
inquiry) of copyright protection when a physical copy that bears 
proper notice is available in general circulation.79 
Twenty-first century consumers use digital literary and artistic 
works like music, image, and video files, and electronic books (e-
books) that they often acquire by download (legally or illegally) from 
third party websites or by direct transfer from other users.  These end-
users are often quite far removed downstream from copyright owners.  
This is especially true given the interactive nature of use in the digital 
environment that has forever changed user involvement and 
expectations.  These uses include: Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing and 
streaming, social networking (e.g., Facebook), microblogging (e.g., 
Twitter), interactive online gaming (e.g., Second Life), consumer-as-
cumulative creator (e.g., Vimeo), and consumer-as-critic (e.g., 
TripAdvisor and OpenTable.com). 
Digital natives are most comfortable utilizing some form of 
digital media in virtually every daily interaction, and they often seem 
at a loss without these supports.80  In contrast to the habits of the 
digital native, digital immigrants, those born before the Internet and 
digital technology became pervasive and ubiquitous, distinguish the 
cyber world from the physical world both conceptually and actually;81 
77.  See generally Brian Sheridan, Note, The Age of Forgotten Innocence: The Dangers 
of Applying Analog Restrictions to Innocent Infringement in the Digital Era, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1453, 1486 (2011) (examining the interplay between the innocent infringer defense and 
its interpretation by various circuits in the P2P digital file sharing context). 
78.  See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 24, at 4 (comparing iPod-listening digital 
natives to LP-buying digital immigrants). 
79.  See  Maverick Recording v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the Defendant’s young age and naivety could not defeat a Section 402(d) limitation on her 
innocent infringer claim where the notice of copyright was properly displayed on the published 
phonorecord); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
defendant had notice because she had access to physical copies and, therefore, “could have 
learned, had she inquired, that the music was under copyright”). 
80.  Shaheen Shariff, Alyssa Wiseman, & Laura Crestohl, Defining the Lines between 
Children’s Vulnerability to Cyberbullying and the Open Court Principle: Implications of A.B. 
(Litigation Guardian of) v. Bragg Communications Inc., 22 EDUC. & L.J. 1, 7 (2012) 
[hereinafter Defining the Lines]. 
81.  Defining the Lines, supra note 80 (citing Colin Lankshear & Michele Knobel, 
Digital Literacies: Policy, Pedagogy and Research Considerations for Education, Opening 
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or at least they attempt to do so.  It is the digital immigrant who 
struggles most to fit the proverbial round peg of a digital native’s 
expectations and behavioral norms into a square legal framework.82  
Both natives and immigrants alike use technology in unintentionally 
infringing ways.  Ideally, the user safe harbor provision would apply 
to accidental infringement and mea culpa infringement, as I explain 
further below. 
Recall that courts do not factor a defendant’s mental state—that 
is, whether she knew or should have known her acts were infringing 
or whether it was her intent to circumvent the law—into the 
determination of liability.83  Courts only consider the innocent 
infringer argument, if at all, to mitigate damages during the remedies 
phase of an infringement suit.84  Although the Act purports to shield 
innocent infringers from the more onerous remedies, today’s innocent 
infringer is nonetheless exposed to considerable risk of liability and 
stiff economic penalties at a time when traditional safeguards to 
minimize the risk of committing infringement are diminished, fading, 
or have already disappeared.  Part V of this Article highlights these 
risks in the summaries and examples of accidental and mea culpa 
infringement. 
D.  The Digital User at Risk 
Copyrighted works have always reached and benefited the 
average citizen.  Throughout the ages, creators of literary and artistic 
expression have provided its consumers with works that entertain, 
educate, and inform.  Until recently in the Copyright Act’s history, 
however, large-scale infringement was largely out of reach of the 
masses due the technological barriers to access, reproduction, and 
Plenary Address to ITU Conference (Oct. 20, 2005)). 
82.  The research and data presented in Defining the Lines is illuminating:  
It is not surprising, then, that researchers report that 98% of Canadian youth access 
digital media daily and 93% of American teens use the Internet.  Young adults aged 
18 to 24 exchange an average of 3200 messages per month.  Girls aged 14 to 17 
send about 3000 messages per month, and boys between 12 and 14 send 600 texts 
per month.  Social networking sites (SNS) have millions of active users and 
Facebook is recognized globally as an important communication tool for youth.  
While 47% of adults are SNS users, over 70% of teens use SNS and over 60% of 
13- to 17-year-olds have personal SNS profiles.  Lenhart reports that 75% of 12- to 
17-year-olds own cell phones, and 88% like to text message. 
Defining the Lines, supra note 80, at 7–8 (citations omitted). 
83.  See infra Part II.A. 
84.  See Sheridan, supra note 77, at 1460. 
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dissemination on such a scale.  Such mass, intentional infringement 
was left to the wholesale copyright pirate.  The World Wide Web and 
digital technologies, however, have forever changed the end-user’s 
relationship to copyrighted works.85 
In addition to the removal of many technological barriers to 
access and exploitation due to digital technology and the Internet, 
amendments to the Act have mostly dismantled the statutory and 
judicial safeguards originally built into copyright law to shield the 
innocent infringer.86  The changes over time have been gradual, 
cumulative, and largely unrelated to, and without regard for, the fate 
of innocent infringement.87  What remains of protection for the 
accidental and mea culpa infringers is now limited to remedial relief 
that is more theoretical than actual. 
The relief is ‘theoretical’ for several reasons.  First, the breadth 
of copyright subject matter and the scope of protection have expanded 
considerably.  For example, early versions of the Copyright Act 
applied only to books, charts, and maps.  Copyright now includes 
music, visual, and performing arts, and even architectural works.  
Congress also extended protection beyond literal copying, 
publication, and sale of infringing copies to include “substantially 
similar” imitative copying, as well as adaptation (a.k.a. preparing 
derivative works), public performance, and public display.88  
Additionally, the formalities of registration and notice are now 
permissive.89  Although copyright formalities of notice, registration, 
and publication are encouraged to secure additional benefits under the 
1976 version of the Act, they are no longer required.90  Even more 
85.  See Samuelson et al., Directions for Reform, supra note 44, at 1177. 
86.  See generally R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A 
History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 135–45, 148–54 (2007) (explaining that historically it 
was more difficult to infringe because copyright protected far fewer works, the scope of 
protection was more limited and rights depended on, among other requirements, the formalities 
of notice and registration). 
87.  Id. at 175 (asserting that changes to copyright law by the end of the twentieth 
century “significantly increased the risk of infringing a copyrighted work . . . [and] 
simultaneously had the effect of eliminating many of the mechanisms that had protected 
innocent infringers from liability.”). 
88.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2013); Funky Films v. Time Warner, 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (explaining substantial similarity and the infringement standard). 
89.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401–406 (2013).  The formalities of notice, registration, and 
publication are no longer required to secure copyright; however, copyright owners enjoy 
certain privileges and benefits for timely registration.  A deposit of the work is still required. 
17 U.S.C. § 407 (2013). 
90.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401–407 (2013). 
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disconcerting, the duration of protection has been extended well 
beyond the original term of fourteen years.91  The term of copyright 
protection currently runs for the life of the author plus seventy years 
after the author’s death.92 
As Congress continued to dismantle mechanisms that helped to 
reduce the likelihood of innocent infringement by making clearer 
what actions constituted infringement and which works were actually 
protected, technological advances were, in turn, making it far easier to 
infringe unknowingly.93  Professor R. Anthony Reese explains that by 
abolishing the notice requirement, Congress “deprive[d] users of the 
simplest and least expensive means of determining that copyright 
protection is claimed for the work, by whom such protection is 
claimed, and when copyright protection began.”94  The House Report 
on the 1976 Act identified these informational functions of notice as 
of such value and import that the notice requirement should be 
preserved.95 
The result is that end-users in the digital age—who carry the 
greatest economic risk of running afoul of the law—now also have a 
duty to determine the ultimate legal question with no real assurance 
that their legal determination of liability is correct.  The end-user 
bears the sole responsibility to assess whether a work is protected.  
This determination in and of itself is difficult because the version of 
the Copyright Act that existed at the time the rights came into 
existence determines the protection.96  The end-user must then bear 
the attendant risks of strict liability to assess and determine correctly 
ex ante whether the intended use is permissible without 
authorization.97  This assessment is complex and difficult even for 
91.  The original term of copyright in the 1790 Act was 14 years with a renewable 14-
year term if the owner survived the initial term. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 
(1790 Act); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003). 
92.  See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2013). 
93.  See Reese, supra note 86, at 176. 
94.  Id. at 177. 
95.  Id.  The corresponding Senate Report also noted the intrinsic value lost by 
eliminating the notice requirement. 
96.  By way of example, the Copyright Term and Public Domain in the United States 
chart maintained by Cornell University demonstrates how complex and nuanced a 
determination is in practice. See Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States, 
Cornell University, http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm (last updated Jan. 
3, 2013). 
97.  See Lipton, supra note 8, at 774 (arguing that the difficulty with the fair use defense 
in practice has been that its boundaries are notoriously difficult to establish ex ante). 
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intellectual property attorneys and judges ex post.  For the close cases 
in particular, such a sophisticated and nuanced determination involves 
a multi-factor analysis wholly dependent on context and the facts and 
circumstances of each situation.98  In short, the layperson can rarely if 
ever resolve ex ante the ultimate legal question with any reasonable 
degree of certainty. 
One can easily see that a bright-lined rule to determine liability 
is efficient from a judicial economy perspective and creates certainty 
for the plaintiff and defendant alike.  And as between the innocent 
owner and user, the user traditionally was in the best position to avoid 
the harm.  However, due to the ease with which innocent 
infringement can and does occur millions of times each day in the 
digital environment, it seems reasonable that a court should consider a 
defendant’s mental state and intent under certain circumstances 
during the liability phase of an infringement action.99 
E.  The Impact of Strict Liability on Innocent Infringers 
The 1909 Act revision abandoned knowledge as a pre-cursor to 
liability, thus making copyright infringement a strict liability offense.  
In 1931, the Supreme Court confirmed this interpretation in Buck v. 
Jewell-Lasalle Realty Co.100  Accordingly, courts treated those who 
technically infringed without knowledge or intent like those who 
knowingly and recklessly infringed.  Their fate as to damages rested 
within the discretion of the judge during the remedies phase and their 
only recourse was the statutory limitation on a copyright claimant’s 
ability to recover against them.101 
The strict liability nature of copyright infringement is 
98.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2013); see also Lipton, supra note 8, at 774–75. 
99.  Lipton, supra note 8, at 767 (exploring innocent infringement as an affirmative 
defense or, in the alternative, an element in establishing liability); Michael Traynor & Katy 
Hutchinson, Some Open Questions About Intellectual Property Remedies, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 453, 466 (2010) (suggesting mental state should be considered in the initial liability 
determination because it might make a difference whether a defendant violated the law 
intentionally or not).  If Congress does not reform the Act to consider mental state at the 
liability phase, it could also consider ex post to determine whether a minimum damage award 
is appropriate.  Currently judges have discretion to find a defendant innocently infringed; 
however in a forthcoming article I argue the determination should, instead, be mandatory. See 
generally Tonya Evans, Is There Any Safer Harbor from Statutory Damages in the Digital 
Age? (on file with the author). 
100.  283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (noting the “[i]ntention to infringe is not essential under 
the Act.”). 
101.  See Reese, supra note 86, at 179. 
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problematic to innocent infringers in the digital age.  Today’s user 
may not have notice of a copyright holder’s rights (even or especially 
if such information is embedded or encrypted within digital goods).  
Additionally, consumers are no longer always in the best position to 
avoid the copyright infringement because technology has facilitated 
an exponential increase in opportunities to access copyrighted works 
at the same time that Congress dismantled legal safeguards of 
copyright formalities (namely, mandatory notice and registration) that 
provided actual or at least constructive notice to the end-user of 
rights.  Further, strict liability is not necessarily the most efficient 
means of protecting a copyright owner’s interests.  With arguably 
hundreds of thousands of technical infringements occurring each day, 
strict liability seems imprudent as a matter of judicial economy.  Strict 
liability also seems inappropriate given the reality that an optimally 
functioning Internet necessitates, and in fact depends on, certain 
technical infringements.102 
Courts have typically imposed strict liability where: (1) a 
defendant has notice of a plaintiff’s rights, particularly where those 
rights involve a property interest; (2) a mental state requirement on 
the part of the defendant would create an untenable burden on the 
plaintiff; (3) the defendant is in a better position to avoid the harm 
than the plaintiff; or, (4) it is deemed more efficient—either 
administratively or economically—for the defendant to bear the risk 
of the loss.103 
One could reasonably argue that strict liability in copyright 
infringement cases made sense in the early years.  At that time, 
infringement was hard to commit on a large scale and sufficient 
safeguards existed to give notice of copyright claims; therefore the 
defendant was in the best position to avoid liability.  Accordingly, 
strict liability was the most efficient result.  However, twenty-first 
century realities call into question whether the same conclusions can 
be made at this time in the history and evolution of copyright law.  
Unintentional infringement is far easier to commit and a lack of 
sufficient safeguards has further muddied the waters.  Therefore, the 
defendant may no longer be in the best position to avoid the harm.  Of 
102.  See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright 
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1841 (2000) 
(discussing the discredited case Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena) (“All of this activity 
arguably infringes the copyright holder’s exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution.”). 
103.  See generally Lipton, supra note 8, at 808. 
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course, the defendant does remain in the best position to mitigate the 
harm upon notice.  Accordingly, a sufficient opportunity to cure upon 
notice of the copyright holder’s rights seems a reasonable, fair, and 
efficient approach to innocent infringement. 
III.  THE DMCA AND OSP SAFE HARBOR AS A MODEL FOR THE DIRECT 
INNOCENT INFRINGER 
OSP safe harbor protection is an essential legal device that 
serves not only to limit liability but also to bring certainty to the 
industry, thereby encouraging OSPs to further invest and innovate in 
online services and digital communications technologies.  Ultimately, 
this Article highlights the shared concerns about liability between the 
OSP industry and the good faith users of their services who should 
also benefit from similar safe harbor protections.  After all, an OSP 
(and the Internet) is only as successful as its users.  However, current 
domestic laws and international agreements seem structured to protect 
rights holders at all costs with little regard or explicit recognition of 
the value in also safeguarding the interests of those who use—
intentionally and unintentionally—copyrighted works.104 
In 1998, Congress enacted the DMCA in an effort to further 
extend the scope of copyright protection and proscribe access to 
copyrighted works.  It created a safe harbor exemption from liability 
for qualifying OSPs that otherwise would be held secondarily liable 
for the direct infringement of their customers.105  Because the DMCA 
104.  See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 21 (2004) (discussing the TRIPS Agreement, the means by which the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade governs intellectual property at the international 
level).  In her essay, Professor Dreyfuss presents a compelling case for the need for explicit 
user rights internationally. 
105.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2013).  The DMCA was passed on October 12, 1998, by a 
unanimous vote in the United States Senate and shortly thereafter signed into law by President 
Bill Clinton on October 28, 1998.  The DMCA both extended the breadth of copyright 
protection and simultaneously limited the secondary liability of the providers of online 
services for the direct copyright infringement by their users.  Service provider is defined as:  
(1) Service provider.—(A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” 
means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for 
digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of 
material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material 
as sent or received. 
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service provider” 
means a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities 
therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A). 
Id. § 512(k). 
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extends protections to creative works beyond the exclusive § 106 
rights to copy, distribute, prepare derivative works, and perform or 
display publicly, some commentators have referred to the DMCA 
rights as “paracopyright.”106 
Copyright law actually recognizes at least five safe harbors for 
companies that “facilitate, even if not intentionally so, the infringing 
acts of others.”107  In the Sony Betamax case, the Supreme Court 
articulated the first safe harbor, a creature of judicial construction that 
predates the DMCA.108  In that case, the Court held that a 
manufacturer cannot be found liable for contributory infringement if 
the device in question is “capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.”109  Sony was the Court’s first attempt to reconcile an 
intermediary’s liability for the infringing acts of its users.  The other 
recognized safe harbors appear in the DMCA after courts and 
Congress settled into a balance between supporting technological 
advances and protecting copyright.  These provisions, scattered 
throughout the DMCA, relieve from liability OSPs that engage in: (1) 
transitory digital network communications (e.g., P2P file sharing);110 
(2) system caching (e.g., temporary file storage for quick access);111 
(3) remote information storage (e.g., file storage on OSP servers);112 
and (4) information location tools (e.g., search engines and 
indexes).113 
By enacting the DMCA, Congress remained consistent with its 
historical approach to innocent infringers because it demonstrated a 
willingness to protect “innocents” in the digital and online 
106.  For discussion of paracopyright and the DMC, see generally Dan L. Burk, 
Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2003). See also H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, 
pt. 2, at 24 (1998) (quoting a letter endorsed by sixty-two copyright professors characterizing 
the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions as “paracopyright”). 
107.  See Directions for Reform, supra note 44, at 1195. 
108.  See id. (citing Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
109.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
110.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (a) (2013). 
111.  Id. § 512 (b). 
112.  Id. § 512 (c). 
113.  Id. § 512 (d).  Professors Samuelson describes the safe harbor provisions found in 
17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)–(d) as follows:   
These safe harbors allow ISPs (1) to transmit digital content from one user to 
another free from concern about whether the transmitted material is or is not 
infringing, (2) to store digital content on behalf of customers, (3) to cache digital 
content to make it more accessible to customers, and (4) to facilitate users’ queries 
to locate information of interest to them. 
Directions for Reform, supra note 44, at 1195. 
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environments, under certain circumstances, or at least from secondary 
liability.  A primary concern was that OSPs lacked: (1) sufficient 
control over the direct infringer and (2) sufficient knowledge of 
infringing activity to justify holding them strictly liable for the 
infringing acts of its users.114  In other words, a primary justification 
for the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions was one of fairness, provided 
the OSP follow certain guidelines to notify the infringer and 
takedown the allegedly infringing material.115  Finally, a fundamental 
goal was to ensure robust and rapid development of the breadth and 
reach of the Internet platform and capabilities to support economic 
growth and worldwide connectivity across all socioeconomic and 
cultural lines.116 
OSPs were concerned about the legal implications of their 
Internet and digital communications services, especially those 
regarding copyright.  Early on, OSPs primarily played a passive and, 
therefore, innocent role when their customers committed infringing 
acts on their service platform.117  But as the focus of the OSP industry 
switched from mere conduit—think “a series of tubes” thanks to 
Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens118—to provider of premium 
entertainment services, the industry sought to find common ground 
with the entertainment industry (as well as with law and 
policymakers) on an approach to infringement concerns.119  For 
example, the move to deliver most content via the Internet that has 
traditionally been experienced on television and in movie theatres is 
no longer in its early phase of deployment.  Examples include Google 
114.  See Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 99–100 (2005). 
115.  Id. at 115–18. 
116.  Stephanie Condon, Stimulus Bill Includes $7.2 Billion for Broadband, CNET 
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10165726-38.html; see Yu, supra 
note 20, at 1375 nn.7–8 (citing American Recovery Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 128, 512 (2009)). 
117.  See Yu, supra note 20, at 1384 (citing COMMERCE, INDUS. & TECH., H.K. SPECIAL 
ADMIN. REGION, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT, at iv (2007)). Cf 
A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 
913 (2005). 
118.  Bluefalcon 561, Series of Tubes, YOUTUBE (July 17, 2006),  http://ww w.youtube.c
om/watch?v=f99PcP0aFNE.  To hear Senator Stevens’ painful ‘digital immigrant’ explanation 
of how the Internet works and the ‘tubes’ reference, visit YouTube.  The tube reference is at 
2:15. 
119.  Yu, supra note 20, at 1386 (discussing the deal struck between Comcast and 
General Electric to acquire a majority stake interest in NBC Universal followed by a long-term 
content licensing deal with CBS to deliver its content online). 
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TV, Hulu Plus, and Netflix original programming.  The DMCA was 
the legislative culmination of this shared goal.  It provided a way to 
mitigate potential liability for OSPs and thus supported the 
development and viability of the Internet and digital communications 
technologies. 
The online environment requires greater flexibility in the 
application of copyright laws.  By enacting the DMCA, Congress has 
already acknowledged that the Internet and digital technology require 
modifications to 20th century laws in the wake of the emergence of 
invaluable 21st century technologies and resulting accepted user 
practices.120  It seems logical then that users of these essential 
technologies should be afforded some protection from strict copyright 
liability, at least under certain circumstances and provided users meet 
certain conditions.121 
IV.  PROPOSED STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR USER ‘SAFE HARBOR’ 
As Part II explains, the viability of the innocent infringer defense 
used to mitigate statutory damages has all but disappeared in the case 
of digital goods due to a number of factors unrelated to the propriety 
of the defense itself.  The absence of a viable innocent infringer 
argument coupled with the strict liability nature of copyright 
infringement and discretionary range of statutory damage awards has 
led to little, if any, protection for the accidental and mea culpa 
infringers in the online context.  This, in turn, has often led to grossly 
inequitable awards and unconscionable results even in cases where 
the plaintiff is far from sympathetic.122 
A related and equally serious concern is that many infringement 
cases settle and thus do not reach trial.  But the absence of a 
substantial body of case law does not mean the concerns raised in this 
Article are more theoretical than actual.  Quite to the contrary, the 
120.  Congress’ enactment of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act is another example 
of its willingness to amend the Act to reflect nuanced technological challenges at odds with 
copyright law in need of industry-specific and technology-specific fixes. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 901–
914 (2013).  For a general overview of the SCPA, see generally Steven P. Kasch, The 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Past, Present, and Future, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 71 (1992). 
121.  The need for such flexibility in the digital age has also been recognized in other 
areas of intellectual property law.  For example, the Ninth Circuit noted the need for flexibility 
in trademark law in its decision in Playboy v. Netscape.  The court opined that “[i]n the 
Internet context, courts must be flexible in applying the [likelihood of confusion] factors, as 
some may not apply.”  See Playboy v. Netscape, 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004).  
122.  See cases cited supra note 16. 
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propensity of users faced with a lawsuit to settle out of court makes 
users especially vulnerable to copyright misuse.123  This result is 
problematic given current 21st century accepted practices, the 
prevalence of UGC, the extreme ease with which one may 
unknowingly infringe in the online context, and the confusing 
selective nonenforcement that is impossible to predict with any 
meaningful degree of certainty.124  Professor Tim Wu describes such 
infringements as “tolerated uses.”  He defines a tolerated use as 
“infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner 
may be aware yet does nothing about.”125  The tolerated use concept 
fits a broader category of copyright owner selective nonenforcement, 
as Professor Lee noted, that also includes ‘“acquiesced use, accepted 
use, publicly encouraged use, and uses that even might be supported 
by implied licenses.”’126  Selective nonenforcement illustrates the 
types of unauthorized uses with which even major content owners are 
willing to live.  Tolerated uses on YouTube, for example, reflect 
established tolerated uses in the music and other entertainment 
industries due in large measure to the monetization of the YouTube 
pages of infringing material.127  Accordingly, Congress could either 
elect to add such practices to the list of fair uses found in § 107 or to 
the types of unauthorized uses that trigger the possibility of user safe 
123.  The misuse defense that originated in the patent law context was first extended to 
copyright in Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).  Other circuits 
have since followed suit. See generally Alcatel USA v. DGI Technologies, 166 F.3d 772 (5th 
Cir. 1999), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 180 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1999); DSC 
Communications v. DGI Technologies, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Data General v. 
Grumman Systems Support, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994) (copyright misuse defense 
considered but not applied because defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to overcome 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on antitrust issue); Atari Games v. Nintendo of 
America, 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, en banc suggestion declined, (Nov. 17, 
1992) (recognizing copyright misuse defense but holding it barred by defendant’s “unclean 
hands”). Cf. United States v. Loews, 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (tying arrangements in licensing of 
motion pictures for theatrical performances held to violate anti-trust laws).  For a 
comprehensive overview of the history, relevant case law and equitable remedies associated 
with the defense, see Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
901 (2004). 
124.  See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008); see also 
Tim Wu, American Lawbreaking: Tolerated Use and the Copyright Problem, SLATE.COM 
(Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_poli tics/jurisprudence/features/2007/
american_lawbreaking/tolerated_use_the_copyright_problem.html. 
125.  See Wu, supra note 124, at 619. 
126.  See Yu, supra note 20, at 1412 (citing Lee, supra note 75, at 1486–88)). 
127.  See Copyright Overview, YOUTUBE.COM, http://www.yout ube.com/t/content_man
agement (last visited October 7, 2013) (describing YouTube’s Content ID System, which 
includes content verification and audio/video ID). 
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harbor protection.  I suggest the latter more fully in my proposed user 
safe harbor discussion in Part V. 
Understanding how today’s user views transformative uses of 
creative works, especially those accessed via the Internet, can also 
provide valuable information about ways the law can transform to 
meet innocents where they are.128  The average user’s 
misunderstanding or general lack of understanding altogether of the 
complex and nuanced law of copyright necessitates a new approach to 
infringement liability.  User safe harbor is such an approach.  The 
proposed language identifies certain customary and accepted practices 
as both beneficial and innocent uses.  As a result, innocent use 
contemplates both the unwitting user and the mistaken one.  Finally, 
in addition to any reform to the statutory damages framework, 
Congress should provide safe harbor to certain classes of technical 
infringements that are noncommercial and, on balance, promote rather 
than thwart progress.  Part V outlines specific examples of the types 
of ordinary online consumer activities labeled as accidental or mea 
culpa to which a user safe harbor provision would apply. 
A.  Practical Considerations in User Safe Harbor 
Notice plays an important role in determining damages under the 
current statutory damages scheme after liability has been assessed.  
Most importantly for the accidental or mea culpa infringer today, 
properly affixed copyright notice on hard copies of a copyrighted 
work currently serves as a complete bar to a minimum damage 
award.129  Therefore, accidental or mea culpa infringers rarely, if 
ever, qualify for the decreased statutory damage award and instead 
must submit to the range of damages for an ordinary infringer that 
extends from $750 to $30,000 per infringement.130 
Courts have rejected the innocent infringer argument in digital 
goods cases even if the defendant did not have actual possession of a 
physical copy bearing proper notice of the digital good in question.131  
128.  See Tushnet, supra note 33, at 497.  
129.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2013); see also 17 U.S.C. § 402 (2013) (except as provided 
in section 504(c)(2), when a copy or phonorecord bears a properly affixed notice: “no weight 
shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement 
in mitigation of actual or statutory damages.”). 
130.  See supra Part II.A.; see supra notes 40–44. 
131.  Maverick Recording v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding 
defendant’s young age and naivety was irrelevant where the notice of copyright was properly 
displayed on the published phonorecord; ultimately barring Harper from using the “innocent 
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Those courts linked notice to access through general availability of a 
physical copy bearing notice in the marketplace and held defendants 
to have constructive notice of the rights at issue in the case.132  The 
link between notice and access under these circumstances seems to 
result from a court’s narrow interpretation of § 504.133  I view with 
great skepticism the impact of such an interpretation on the 
availability of an innocent infringer defense in cases involving digital 
goods.  In fact, a court’s narrow interpretation of § 504 in digital 
content controversies runs the risk of being inequitable, unsound, and 
inconsistent with the historical purpose and goal of shielding the 
unknowing user from excessive awards.  The danger of inequitable 
rulings, contrary to the copyright monopoly’s constitutional call, 
seems especially troubling in civil actions where the main goals are 
compensation and deterrence (rather than penalty).134  If Congress 
adopts my user safe harbor proposal, the type of constructive notice 
currently recognized in digital goods infringement cases will no 
longer have the same meaning or effect at the liability phase. 
Notice would continue to play an important role in my proposed 
user safe harbor provision.  However, notice would be considered in 
assessing whether liability will result at all, rather than during the 
remedies phase of an infringement case after liability has already been 
determined.  Rather than serving as a complete bar to a minimum 
statutory damage award, notice would serve as a trigger requiring 
qualifying users to take immediate remedial steps to protect the 
copyright owner in order to receive safe harbor from liability. 
In Part III, I highlighted a primary concern of OSPs, a primary 
justification for DMCA safe harbor in light of that concern, and a 
infringer” defense); Electra Entm’t Grp. Inc. v. McDowell, No. 4:06-CV-115, 2007 WL 
3286622, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 6, 2007) (citing BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 889, 892 
(7th Cir. 2005)) (holding “[a] defendant who violated a copyright by downloading data to a 
computer would not be an innocent infringer if he or she had access to records and compact 
disks bearing the proper [copyright] notice[]”); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, No. 03C6276, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 910 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2005) (holding defendant was not entitled to claim 
innocent infringement because the thirty songs defendant downloaded had properly displayed 
copyright notification, to consumers, on the covers of the CDs). 
132.  See cases cited supra note 131. 
133.  See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 459.  Patry on Copyright explains: 
“Section 504(c) creates four categories of infringers for statutory damage purposes: (1) certain 
individuals at nonprofit educational institutions or public broadcasting entities who had 
reasonable grounds for believing their conduct was fair use, (2) innocent infringers, (3) not 
innocent but not willful infringers, and (4) willful infringers.” 6 Patry on Copyright § 22:175 
(2012). 
134.  See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 500. 
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fundamental goal of the DMCA in its entirety.135  I assert those 
observations apply equally to accidental and mea culpa users.  Thus, 
such users should receive mandatory safe harbor from the standard 
and willful damage awards. 
First, a primary concern was that OSPs lacked sufficient control 
over the direct infringer and sufficient knowledge of infringing 
activity to justify holding them strictly liable for the infringing acts of 
its users.  Direct users who are not actively disregarding copyright 
law are similarly concerned with a lack of control over one who may 
share or transfer infringing material and who lack sufficient 
knowledge of the infringement.136  It seems the law should be more 
focused on the one who knowingly or recklessly distributed infringing 
material than the unwitting recipients unless that recipient has some 
control over the third-party transferor or knowledge (or reasonable 
basis for knowing) of the infringement. 
Second, a primary justification for the DMCA’s safe harbor 
provisions was one of fairness as long as the OSP followed certain 
guidelines to notify the infringer and takedown the allegedly 
infringing material.137  Similarly, it seems fair to afford an accidental 
or mea culpa infringer the opportunity to take reasonable and quick 
steps to cure the infringement.  This might include a “take down [sic] 
and delete” requirement for infringing materials.  Reasonable 
measures may also include requiring the user to post a notice of action 
taken if the infringement involved a static point of access or to 
disseminate such a notice to third party recipients.138 
Finally, a fundamental goal of DMCA safe harbor was to ensure 
robust and rapid development of the Internet platform and capabilities 
to support economic growth and worldwide connectivity across all 
socioeconomic and cultural lines.139  This applies equally to Internet 
users.  Again, the success of the Internet depends not only on OSPs 
and technology but, ultimately, on the very users themselves.  Threats 
of legal action and fear of onerous reprisals can clearly lead to a 
stifling effect on user behaviors even to the detriment of fair uses and 
135.  See supra Part III. 
136.  See Scott, supra note 114, at 99–100. 
137.  Id. 
138.  One might wonder, however, whether these measures place an onerous burden on 
consumers.  In this way, consumers might be transformed from copyright criminal to copyright 
cop.  However, whatever burden may result pales in comparison to the burden of strict liability 
in all cases and the very real danger of excessive discretionary damage awards. 
139.  See Yu, supra note 20, at 1375–76; Condon, supra note 116. 
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permissive access.  User safe harbor is the right solution at the right 
time. 
B.  Proposed User Safe Harbor: Section 512 Re-Imagined 
Despite the general reluctance in the United States to embrace 
forced exchanges in a free-market system, some scholars suggest that 
enforcing copyright as a liability rule instead of a property rule best 
achieves these goals in the digital context.140  Notable scholars have 
also proposed copyright reform in the following ways relevant to this 
Article: “reinvigorating copyright registration,”141 “administrative 
reforms,”142 refinement of the § 106 exclusive rights,143 additional, 
broader safe harbor protections for OSPs who take reasonable 
measures to deter infringement,144 modifications of the statutory 
damages scheme,145 and more robust recognition of “copyright 
limitations and exceptions.”146  A more earnest noncommercial 
personal use exemption could also be clarified and recognized.147 
The idea of administrative reforms to increase the role of the 
Copyright Office to fill the types of gaps noted above seems plausible 
and desirable.  The Copyright Office, for example, could be involved 
in issuing opinion letters, rulemaking, and regulations.  In fact, at 
Congress’ request, the Copyright Office is considering the idea of a 
small claims court.148  However, concerns over whether the Office 
140.  See generally Traynor & Hutchinson, supra note 99, at 454–55 (exploring 
“whether infringement should be treated primarily as subject to a rule of liability rather than a 
rule of property, with significantly different consequences for remedial relief, not only in 
patent and copyright cases but also in trademark and trade secret cases.”). 
141.  See Directions for Reform, supra note 44, at 1198 (“Copyright law should 
encourage copyright owners to register their works so that better information will be available 
as to who claims copyright ownership in which works.”). 
142.  Id. at 1202 (offering several ideas for modernizing the role and functions of the 
Copyright Office). 
143.  Id. at 1208 (exploring, without consensus, whether copyright should be refined and 
limited as one “core” right). 
144.  Id. at 1216 (suggesting that DMCA safe harbor protection be extended to OSPs 
that, through technological safeguards, take reasonable, affirmative steps illuminate or mitigate 
infringement committed by its users). 
145.  Id. at 1220 (recommending that Congress create guidelines to better enable courts 
to award statutory damages “in a consistent, reasonable, and just manner”). 
146.  Id. at 1228 (“More elements in copyrighted works than just ideas and information 
should be excluded from the scope of copyright’s protection for original works of 
authorship.”). 
147.  Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and Personal Use Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. 
REV. 2067, 2069 (2012). 
148.  See  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS: A REPORT OF THE 
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would actually be able to handle the overwhelming volume of claims 
resulting from the gaps and gray areas are noteworthy.149  It seems 
more beneficial to address the root cause of concern—unclear laws—
and to amend existing law by, among other things, limiting liability 
where appropriate rather than merely (and predictably) continue to 
treat the symptoms and tinkering at the edges of the law. 
A user safe harbor amendment would directly impact § 512, 
which identifies who qualifies for safe harbor.  OSPs and nonprofit 
educational institutions already receive safe harbor protection under 
the DMCA provisions.150  Subsection (c) of § 512 provides a sound 
framework for the user safe harbor statutory language.  On showing 
the user had no actual or constructive knowledge that her use was 
infringing and, upon receiving notice, the user acted “expeditiously” 
to cease the infringing activity, any potential damages are instead 
remitted.  When the user has satisfied the requirements, she would 
qualify for safe harbor as a matter of right.  Constructive notice, under 
this new approach, would not be satisfied by mere access to physical 
copies in general circulation bearing properly affixed notice. 
By adopting and adapting the existing statute to apply also to 
users, the language could read as follows: 
 
(_) Limited User Exception.— 
 
(1) In general. — A User found liable for infringement of 
copyright by reason of the reproduction, adaptation, 
dissemination, transmission, or storage of copyrighted 
material or by reason of referring or linking to material 
accessed electronically on a system or network, shall not be 
liable for actual or statutory damages if the User— 
 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an 
activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; 
 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2013), available at  http://www.copyright.gov/ docs/smallclaims/us
co-smallcopyrightcla ims.pdf (2013); see also Remedies for Copyright Small Claims, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/ (describing 
the study of remedies for small copyright claims). 
149.  See Lee, supra note 75, at 1475. 
150.  17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(c) (2013). 
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(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; 
 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity; and 
 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement [as described in 
paragraph (3) (Contents of counter notification)], responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity 
and takes any reasonable and prudent measures to cease and desist 
the claimed infringement, including notice by transmission or 
disclaimer to any third party recipients of the subject work. 
 
Of course, opponents of this approach may argue that no 
reasonable online user would believe the vast majority of digital 
works available online or via P2P networks are free for the taking.  In 
that case, perhaps the suggested framework is a theoretical assertion 
without a practical application.  But even if one argues, for example, 
that all users should know that music, image, video, and other digital 
works are likely protected by copyright or at least owned by someone 
other than the user, it is critical to make clear that the Act does not 
prohibit all uses, only those listed in § 106151 and not excused by §§ 
107–122.152 
In sum, many commonplace noncommercial online user 
activities described in this Article currently constitute technical 
infringements.  My user safe harbor alternative could safeguard 
innocent infringers engaging in these commonplace activities from 
liability.  Such uses serve to support technological advancement and a 
fully realized Internet without unduly threatening copyright and 
“progress.”  In fact, such practices promote the very progress that the 
constitutional drafters contemplated. 
C.  Other Alternatives 
Although my proffered user safe harbor amendment is a viable 
151.  U.S.C. 17 § 106 (2013) (discussing unauthorized reproduction, publication, public 
display and performance, and adaptation). 
152.  U.S.C. 17 §§ 107–122 (2013).  Sections 107–122 are limits on copyright 
protection. Id. 
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option to cure the innocent infringement remedy problem in some 
cases, this Part explores suggestions other commentators offer to 
reform copyright liability and remedies that could also lessen the 
negative impacts on copyright consumers in the digital age.  The 
numerous and varied approaches, a few of which are discussed below, 
suggest a pressing need for reform in this area.  The cacophony of 
calls for reform suggest it is not a matter of if but when the next major 
overhaul of copyright law will take place.  In the midst of this sea of 
possibilities, I argue the user safe harbor is perhaps a lighthouse of 
opportunity. 
Some scholars advocate for a complete overhaul of the existing 
legislative framework.153  Others encourage at least a more uniform 
judicial approach and a narrow interpretation of statutory damages 
unless and until Congress acts.154  In either case, the goal would be to 
revive more meaningful safeguards against liability or at least to 
eliminate excessive awards against innocent infringers and return to a 
just standard and result.  Other fixes include: (1) legislative comments 
offering guidance on how to apply the tripartite system in addition to 
DMCA-like safe harbor for direct accidental infringers; (2) an express 
definition of willful infringement; and (3) clarity on what constitutes 
knowledge of copyright protection in the case of digital goods. 
V.  USER SAFE HARBOR IN ACTION 
Millions of unauthorized uses of copyrighted works occur every 
day on the Internet.  The current judicial and negotiated licensing 
system is ill-equipped to handle a case-by-case resolution, the issues 
of detection and enforcement notwithstanding.  Detection and 
enforcement will play a much more prominent role in the months and 
years to follow as technology improves in this area.  Case in point is 
the launch this year of the much-anticipated and criticized graduated 
response system.155 
In an essay that explores the novel concept of a “warming” (as 
opposed to chilling) effect of user customs and norms on the contours 
of copyright law, Professor Edward Lee refers collectively to that 
153.  See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 509–10. 
154.  Id. at 501–05. 
155.  See Dara Kerr, ‘Copyright Alert System’ rolls out to catch illegal downloaders, 
CNET.COM (Feb. 25, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57571237-83/copyright-alert-
system-rolls-out-to-catch-illegal-downloaders/. 
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universe of uses as “practices.”156  He suggests that the copyright 
world can be divided in two: (1) formal practices consisting of 
copyright law and licensing and (2) informal practices consisting of a 
range of unauthorized uses.157  These unauthorized uses can be 
distinguished even further between those clearly violative of 
copyright and those that exist at the margins within the ever-growing 
gray areas of the formal law.158  His approach injects realist theory 
into copyright law by acknowledging the role actual user behaviors 
and norms can and do play in shaping how copyright functions in 
practice.159 
Professor Lee explains: 
 
In some cases, the informal copyright practices could constitute 
infringement.  In other cases, though, they could be fair use or fall 
within another exemption.  In still other cases, the law might be 
unclear, or the copyright holders might tolerate or later condone 
the practice without ever granting a formal license.  The precise 
status of the practice in question might, therefore, be unclear.  
These “gray areas” should be recognized as such.160 
 
My proposed user safe harbor exemption focuses precisely and 
narrowly on uses that fall within this gray area, an area that emerges 
any time law is “vague on critical issues, leaving the public with no 
specific guidance” and to their own devices unless and until the law 
becomes more clear.161  For example, substantial similarity and fair 
use (especially when transformative use is involved), are two 
fundamental copyright doctrines that define infringement in the 
former case and an affirmative defense to infringement liability in the 
156.  See Lee, supra note 75, at 1470. 
157.  See id.  Lee further explains: “Formal copyright practices take a formalistic view 
of copyright law . . . [where] rights are abstractly and neatly defined by the various provisions . 
. . of the Copyright Act.” Id.  The formalistic approach, then, is a “permission first” practice 
where any unauthorized use that is not a fair use is actionable infringement.  Informal uses, 
however, fall outside of formal law or permission and—particularly in the online 
environment—occur far more frequently by many more users than those making technically 
lawful uses of copyrighted works. Id. at 1472. 
158.  See id. at 1473 (arguing that informal copyright practices can serve as gap fillers in 
copyright law). 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. at 1468. 
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latter case.  Both are notoriously complex and difficult.162 
A layperson’s ex ante determination of the difference between 
fair transformative use and infringing adaptation is particularly 
daunting and vexing given the range of unauthorized uses online 
involving some form of cumulative effort and adaptation.  User safe 
harbor would expressly identify and legitimize certain existing 
informal Internet practices that developed in response to “systemic 
uncertainties in formal copyright law” in a way that balances rights of 
the copyright owner and the user.  This accounts for the reality that 
users who comprise the “public”—not copyright owners—are the 
ultimate beneficiary of the copyright monopoly.163 
The foregoing, of course, begs the question of what user customs 
and practices I contemplate for user safe harbor protection.  Not all 
unauthorized use is created equally.  Nonetheless, in the absence of 
clearly articulated or discernible legal determinations of liability ex 
ante, the uses that might serve as gap fillers164 under Lee’s theory 
provide a welcome starting point.165  First, it is helpful to identify a 
range of common unauthorized uses of digital creative goods.  At a 
minimum, they involve copying, adaptation, and dissemination, 
usually the exclusive domain of copyright owners.  File sharing and 
P2P streaming are probably the most noted and notable uses of digital 
creative goods.  Second, and likely even more pervasive, is the Web 
2.0 copy and paste, drag and drop, remix, and re-contextualize 
162.  Id. at 1480 (“Courts and legal commentators alike have repeated acknowledged the 
complexity and indeterminacy of many key provisions of copyright law.”).  Both substantial 
similarity and fair use are subjective, fact-specific determinations.  However, few cases reach 
the courts, let alone survive to an ultimate judgment. See id. at 1478. 
163.  See id. at 1468 (emphasis added).  Emphasis was added to make the point that an 
optimal rights/access balance exists only when the rights of both the copyright owner and the 
user are protected by the copyright regime. 
164.  Lee uses the term gap “to indicate those areas in formal law where it is relatively 
unclear ex ante how the formal law would treat a particular set of facts.” Id. at 1473.  Such 
would be a gap in the law itself.  He distinguishes his use of the word from a “divergence 
between formal law and law in action—i.e., circumstances in which people do not appear to be 
following the law at all [driving over the speed limit].” Id.  I argue those uses that apply to the 
former case should receive safe harbor.  The latter uses would seem to be pure, actionable 
infringement. 
165.  Lee explains how formal and informal practices co-exist in copyright law:   
The expectation is that all answers to copyright issues will come from either the 
Copyright Act or courts applying it.  This expectation does not square with reality, 
however.  The ‘formal’ law of copyright can only go so far.  It is filled with many 
gaps and gray areas.  That is why informal practices are needed.  They often serve 
as gap fillers in the copyright system. 
Id. 
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culture.166  It is omnipresent and firmly established in the online 
context.167  A third category of use is UGC that involves user creation 
of video, music, images, and literature, and other creative 
productions. 
Rights holders vary in their response to UGC and other 
unauthorized uses.  As discussed above, some choose a selective 
nonenforcement approach sometimes referred to as tolerated use168 or 
hedging.169  In those instances, the owner may be aware of the 
infringing activity but choose not to enforce her rights.170  The 
tolerated use concept fits a broader category of copyright owner 
selective nonenforcement that also includes “acquiesced use, accepted 
use, publicly encouraged use and uses that even might be supported 
by implied licenses.”171  Other rights holders embark on a “shock and 
awe” hyper-aggressive enforcement approach, such as the recording 
industry’s litigation strategy in response to P2P file sharing that began 
in 2003.  The strategy lasted through 2008, when the industry 
abandoned this approach in favor of more effective ways to combat 
piracy.172  Based on this universe of possibilities, the hypothetical set 
forth below addresses how my user safe harbor might apply to the 
accidental and mea culpa infringer. 
The accidental infringer is one who infringes unknowingly.  
Presumably the accidental infringer uses copyrighted materials in a 
way she would not have if she had known her use was infringing.  In 
contrast to the accidental infringer, the mea culpa infringer is one who 
knowingly participates in an unauthorized use but has a colorable 
defense to infringement.  Examples include someone who has a good 
faith but mistaken belief their use was fair, de minimis, or otherwise 
166.  For a general overview of Web 2.0, see generally Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0?, 
OREILLY (Sept. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html.  Web 2.0 
describes websites that use technology beyond the static pages of earlier websites.  Darcy 
DiNucci coined the term in 1999 and Tim O’Reilly popularized it at the O’Reilly Media Web 
2.0 conference in late 2004. 
167.  See Lee, supra note 75, at 1486. 
168.  See Wu, supra note 124, at 619; see also Madhavi Sunder & Anupam Chander, 
Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of ‘Mary Sue’ Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 597 (2007). 
169.  Lee, supra note 75, at 1461 (“On some occasions, copyright holders may, in fact, 
prefer to ‘hedge’ by allowing third-party uses of their works informally, instead of by formal 
license.”). 
170.  See Wu, supra note 124, at 619. 
171.  See Yu, supra note 20, at 1412. 
172.  See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL 
STREET J. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12296603883 6021137.html. 
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legally permissive or excused.  Their mistaken belief could be based 
on accepted user expectations and informal practices developed due 
to the gaps and gray areas in online copyright law, as discussed more 
fully above.173  To be sure, those uses easily and often lead to 
mistaken fair uses, especially given that the enumerated purposes for 
fair use may be underinclusive in light of current user practices.174 
Even when the facts suggest objectively that an end-user had a 
plausible defense or legal excuse, if either argument fails at trial the 
defendant is often at the mercy of the same statutory damages range 
as those infringers who knew their use was infringing.  Indeed, the 
trend in statutory damage awards is to award large discretionary civil 
awards that are both punitive in effect and intent.175  This unfortunate 
trend serves to further erode the legal “space” necessary for second-
generation creators to create something new from what already exists 
and meaningfully participate in commonplace Internet activities.176  It 
also threatens the viability of a robust exchange on the Internet, which 
Congress already affirmed as an essential component and integral part 
of the American and global economies.  Therefore, the mea culpa 
infringer is also an ideal candidate for the proposed user safe harbor 
provision. 
Imagine a blogger, Beatrice, who shares political commentary 
via her free Wordpress website (which does not permit revenue-
generating activities).  Believing, in good faith, that sharing news 
reporting is a fair use of copyrighted material, she copies and pastes 
articles from similar political commentary sites into her own blog 
posts with a link to the copied site rather than writing independently 
created op-eds.  Additionally, her free Wordpress blog is configured 
to share the post automatically with her blog followers via e-mail, as 
well as on Facebook and Twitter.  Immediately on receiving the e-
mail notification a recipient forwards the e-mail containing the full 
article to ten people, one of whom, Frederick, decides to copy and 
paste it into his Facebook status.  Ten of Frederick’s Facebook friends 
love the article so much that they repost some or all of it on their own 
Facebook pages. 
173.  See supra Part V. 
174.  See supra Part V (discussing gaps and gray areas in copyright, as articulated by 
Professor Edward Lee). 
175.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 17, at 446. 
176.  Evans, supra note 56, at 100 (discussing the essential legal space second-
generation creators in performing arts and appropriation art forms need to create new works 
from existing materials, some of which may be copyrighted). 
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The original news article author, Olivia, gets wind of the 
unauthorized reproduction and publication and submits a request for a 
takedown notice of the offending material from every Facebook 
user’s page and to Wordpress to remove the material from the 
website.  Both Facebook and Wordpress, as OSPs, act expeditiously 
to takedown the infringing material and notify the offending users.  
Olivia does not stop there.  She decides to file suit against Beatrice 
and each person in the chain that copied and republished the news 
article without permission.  Olivia’s attorney opines that even if fair 
use included “news reporting” as one of the enumerated purposes, it 
would not excuse the republishing of the entire article under these 
circumstances.  And for all others, notice on the hard copies of 
Beatrice’s nationally distributed newsletters exhibits a copyright 
notice, which serves as a complete bar to an innocent infringement. 
In this one example, dozens of accidental and mea culpa 
copyright infringements have occurred due to the direct unauthorized, 
copying (copy and paste) and random access memory, and read-only 
memory copying, as well as distribution of infringing copies.  The 
DMCA will protect the OSPs involved in the equation.  But, absent 
the user safe harbor I propose, what happens to those end-users who 
held a good faith but mistaken belief that they were actually or 
impliedly permitted to share the information in its entirety?  Without 
safe harbor protection, and assuming the original copyright owner 
timely registered, each person in the chain is potentially liable for 
moderate damages of $750–$30,000 per infringement; a hefty price to 
pay for noncommercial good faith use.  And yet this scenario plays 
out innumerable times each day.  Indeed, the fact pattern is replete 
with customary and generally accepted practices integral to a robust 
Internet exchange that cause little harm, and yet carry a potential 
liability that might serve to chill rather than promote progress.  
Accordingly, my user safe harbor would balance the user’s privilege 
with copyright owner’s rights in a way that ultimately benefits society 
at large. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The ever-widening scope of copyright’s subject matter, breadth, 
and duration of exclusive rights at a time when formalities of 
registration, notice, and publication became permissive instead of 
mandatory has left today’s user extremely vulnerable to infringement 
liability in the online context.  The difficulty for the average user in 
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assessing what uses are permitted, de minimis, or fair, especially in 
light of established online practices, presents a real and present 
concern to a just and rational approach to innocent infringement in the 
21st century.  The dawn, rise, and exponential growth of the Internet 
and digital communications technologies have posed unrivaled 
challenges to existing copyright law.  They have also posed 
increasing threats to traditional notions of copyright at its incentive-
based core. 
But the digital age of worldwide connectivity has enormous 
benefit and value.  It has also made good on the constitutional 
promise to spur innovation and creativity through, among other ways, 
user-generated creations and transformative uses.  Even where such 
unauthorized uses infringe copyright, however, they still support the 
overall success of the Internet as the 21st century epicenter of 
innovation and exchange.  Thus, law and policymakers, OSPs, and 
other stakeholders must recognize the value of established user-
expectation and customary and accepted practices.  They also must 
formalize those beneficial uses that currently exist in the gaps and 
gray areas of copyright law and that cause little, if any, market harm.  
Good faith users deserve safe harbor protection in the digital age.  
The proffered statutory amendment achieves protection of the 
innocent infringer to reflect today’s reality.  It does so in a way that 
contemplates all interest-holders—copyright owners, OSPs, and 
users. 
